onsdag 31 maj 2017

Anholdt af maskerede politifolk: Dansker anklaget for ekstremisme i Rusland

Dennis Christensen er varetægtsfængslet i to måneder efter deltagelse i en gudstjeneste hos Jehovas Vidner i den russiske by Orjol. Foto: jw.com


29. maj 2017

Rusland har varetægtsfængslet en dansk statsborger, der deltog i en gudstjeneste hos Jehovas Vidner. Han risikerer nu op til ti års fængsel.

En dansk statsborger er kommet i klemme i de russiske myndigheders skærpede kurs over for religiøse mindretal.

Dennis Christensen blev anholdt under en gudstjeneste hos Jehovas Vidner i byen Orjol i det centrale Rusland. Han er nu varetægtsfængslet og risikerer op til ti års fængsel.

Anholdelsen er en udløber af Ruslands nylige forbud mod Jehovas Vidner. Ruslands højesteret stemplede i april den kristne gruppe som en ekstremistisk organisation på linje med militante og terroristiske grupper.

Siden har russisk politi slået til mod lokale afdelinger af trossamfundet.

Anholdelsen af Dennis Christensen skete torsdag aften. En gudstjeneste i et privat hus i Orjol blev afbrudt af omkring 15 maskerede og bevæbnede politifolk. De tog alle de tilstedeværende med på stationen, siger en repræsentant for Jehovas Vidner til Berlingske.

»De omringede huset og stormede det. Det mindede om en klassisk operation mod farlige forbrydere,« siger Jaroslav Sivulskij, talsmand for Jehovas Vidner i Rusland.

De øvrige tilbageholdte blev afhørt og senere løsladt. Danskeren blev som den eneste varetægtsfængsel i foreløbigt to måneder. Han er sigtet efter en paragraf om »organisering af en ekstremistisk organisations aktivitet,« fremgår det af en lokal domstols hjemmeside. Strafferammen er ti års fængsel.

Første anholdelse ramte dansker

Det er første gang, et medlem af det pacifistiske trosamfund varetægtsfængsles efter den alvorlige ekstremismeparagraf, siger Roman Lunkin, der er forsker i religiøse mindretal ved det russiske Videnskabernes Akademi.

»Det er første gang siden den sovjetiske periode - ja, siden Stalin - at nogen risikerer 10 års fængsel for at dyrke deres tro,« siger Roman Lunkin.

Kampagnen mod Jehovas Vidner tog fart efter en afgørelsen fra Ruslands højesteret 20. april. Ifølge dommen skulle gruppens hovedkontor og lokalafdelinger opløses og al ejendom overdrages til den russiske stat. Jehovas Vidner har anket afgørelsen og lovet at føre sagen til den Europæiske Menneskeretsdomstol.

Gruppen har flere end 100.000 følgere i Rusland og flere end 2.000 lokale menigheder, der nu ifølge de russiske myndigheder er ulovlige. Ifølge Jehovas Vidner er ejendomme tilhørende troende blevet udsat for hærværk og forsøg på brandstiftelse siden dommen.

Der er flere forklaringer på, hvorfor Jehovas Vidner er blevet genstand for et juridiske frontalangreb fra de russiske myndigheder, vurderer Roman Lunkin. Den russiske regering har de seneste år opbygget en tæt alliance med den dominerende ortodokse kirke, der ser andre kristne grupper, som baptister, protestanter og mormoner, som konkurrenter. Samtidig er grupper som Jehovas Vidner, hvis hovedkontor ligger i USA, kommet i søgelyset under den russiske regerings skærpede kampagne mod vestlig påvirkning de senere år.

»I specialtjenesten ser man - ligesom i sovjettiden - disse grupper med forbindelser til Vesten som en trussel mod Rusland,« siger Roman Lunkin.

Det kan være forklaringen på, at netop en udenlandsk statsborger er blevet mål for den første anholdelse, mener han.Endelig ses Jehovas Vidner som et let offer, eftersom de ikke har bred opbakning uden for egne rækker.

Også i sovjettiden blev gruppen forfulgt. Under sovjetdiktatoren Josef Stalin blev Jehovas Vidner idømt lange fængselsstraffe og deporteret til straffelejre i Sibirien. I dag garanterer russisk lov religionsfrihed. Alligevel er flere religiøse mindretal igen kommet i sikkerhedstjenestens søgelys de senere år.

Trussel mod »offentlig sikkerhed«

Mens den ortodokse kirke, Islam, Buddhisme og Jødedom har status som traditionelle religioner i russisk lov, har flere andre trosretninger meldt om pres fra lokale myndigheder. Adventistkirken er også blevet genstand for trusler om lukning.

Forbuddet mod Jehovas Vidner er dog langt det mest vidtgående. Under retssagen i april argumenterede det russiske justitsministerium for, at Jehovas Vidner »udgør en trussel mod borgernes rettigheder, den offentlige orden og offentlig sikkerhed«. Blandt andet deres modstand mod blodtranfusion blev fremhævet som ekstremistisk. Jehovas Vidner afviser også militærtjeneste.

Hos Jehovas Vidner i Rusland vækker sagen mod Dennis Christensen frygt for flere anholdelser. Danskeren har boet i Rusland i mere end ti år med sin familie. Ifølge Jaroslav Sivulskij er han en menig troende, der heller ikke - som anklagen siger - er involveret i gruppens ledelse.

»Det er nu en realitet i Rusland, at hvis du er troende, så kan du blive sat i fængsel for at mødes og læse i Bibelen,« siger Jaroslav Sivulskij.

Varetægtsfængslingen er anket. Udenrigsministeriet oplyser, at man yder bistand i sagen.

Simon Kruse, Berlingskes korrespondent i Rusland

tisdag 30 maj 2017

Anneksjonen av Krim: Valget som ikke var et valg


30. mai 2017

I dag har jeg på trykk en kronikk i Klassekampen. Den ble skrevet som et tilsvar til Hans Olav Fekjær, en presumptivt oppegående mann som i fullt alvor mener at Russland ikke tok Krimhalvøya med makt og ikke skjønner at dette var en anneksjon.

Leser du kronikken vil du få et lynkurs i hvordan Russland gjennomførte anneksjonen, og dermed indirekte hvorfor Fekjær – og flere med ham – åpenbart har blitt rundlurt av russisk propaganda og tror dette var et slags demokratiprosjekt.

Du vil også få et lite innblikk i hvordan man i Russland bedriver utstrakt historierevisjonisme, blant annet ved å ufarliggjøre Hitlers annekteringer for å renvaske Putin. Og dette er et stort paradoks, for samtidig er et av russisk propagandas viktigste mantra at Ukraina er styrt av nazister og fascister…

I kronikken nevner jeg Andranik Migranyans innlegg i den russiske avisa Isvestija. Det du skal vite er at dette var en reaksjon på at Andrei Zubov hadde hatt et kritisk debattinnlegg hvor han tok et oppgjør med Putins farlige politikk og sammenlignet Putins annektering av Krim med Hitlers annekteringer. Slikt tankegods tas ikke lett på i Russland, for Zubov har en viss tyngde og var professor ved Moskvas statlige institutt for internasjonal politikk, som eies av det russiske utenriksdepartementet.

Dermed kom Migranyan på banen med et forsvar for Putin. Migranyan er heller ingen hvem som helst, og har lang fartstid i det russiske maktapparatet og var på dette tidspunkt leder for en russisk NGO i New York som ble etablert av Putin for å overvåke menneskerettigheter i vestlige land...

Etterspillet ble at Zubov mistet jobben som professor ved Moskvas statlige institutt for internasjonal politikk, for det skal ikke lønne seg å kritisere myndighetene i Russland. Migranyan ble på sin side ansatt som professor samme sted året etter...

Sånn sett er det ganske ironisk at Fekjær kaller meg for ekstrem fordi jeg skriver at Russlands anneksjon i folkerettslig forstand kan sammenlignes med Hitlers og Stalins annekteringer før andre verdenskrig. For hva skal han da mene om Andranik Migranyans tankegods, som attpåtil blir ansatt som professor på et institutt som eies av det russiske utenriksdepartementet?

Har du problemer med å lese kronikken jeg har vedlagt som bilde, har du den samme teksten her:

RUSSLANDS FARLIGE ANNEKSJON

Hans Olav Fekjær påstår i Klassekampen 5. mai at Russland ikke brukte makt på Krim og fremstiller «gjenforeningen» som et slags demokratiprosjekt. Han hevder at jeg er ekstrem fordi jeg skriver at Russlands anneksjon i folkerettslig forstand kan sammenlignes med Hitlers og Stalins annekteringer før andre verdenskrig, og spør retorisk om Hitler konsulterte folkemeningen. Dette bygger på et feilaktig historiesyn.

Faktum er at Hitler avholdt folkeavstemning i Østerrike etter invasjonen i 1938. Resultatet viste at 99,7 prosent av østerrikerne støttet anneksjonen – altså mer enn det Putin oppnådde på Krim. Tilsvarende må Hitler ha visst at anneksjonene av Sudetland og Danzig (Gdansk) ville bli godt mottatt av den altoverveiende tyske lokalbefolkningen, hvilket han fikk rett i. Her kunne dessuten Hitler påberope seg historiske «rettigheter», altså ikke ulikt Putins «gjenforening» med Krim.

BÅDE HITLER OG STALIN brukte overraskelsesmomentet og militær dominans til å innlemme store landområder uten væpnet motstand. På samme måte kunne Putin i 2014 la tusener av russiske elitesoldater, utstyrt med overlegne våpen, lynraskt erobre Krim.

TV-bildene i 2014 viste at russiske styrker umiddelbart omringet ukrainske militærforlegninger og marineskip. De uforberedte ukrainske soldatene kom dermed i en håpløs situasjon, og de fleste valgte raskt å overgi seg. Ifølge russiske Interfax fremsatte angivelig sjefen for den russiske svartehavsflåten et ultimatum hvor han truet med å angripe de gjenværende ukrainske styrkene dersom de ikke la ned våpnene, hvilket de etter hvert gjorde.

Det var således ikke Putins fortjeneste at invasjonen ikke endte i et blodbad, men fordi ukrainske myndigheter og kommandanter innså overmakten og beholdt roen. Aktoratet ved Den internasjonale straffedomstolen (ICC) skriver da også at det er irrelevant at russiske soldater ikke møtte væpnet motstand.

PUTIN HAR SELV SAGT at han tok initiativ til «gjenforeningen» natt til 23. februar. Men på den russisk militære æresmedaljen «For tilbakeføringen av Krim» står det at aksjonen startet 20. februar, to dager før daværende president Janukovytsj ble avsatt.

Den 26. februar stormet så russiske elitesoldater regjeringskontorene og parlamentsbygningen på Krim, og heiste det russiske flagget. Påfølgende morgen ble de folkevalgte truet til et hastemøte. Mange nektet eller snudde da de så de russiske soldatene. Kun 36 av 100 dukket opp, mens forsamlingen trengte 51 for å være beslutningsdyktig. Løsningen ble at man registrerte stemmer på folk som ikke hadde møtt, altså regulært stemmejuks.

DE SOM MØTTE, ble ransaket og fratatt mobiltelefonen. Ingen journalister slapp inn. Bak lukkede dører – med bevæpnede russiske soldater utenfor – ble statsminister Anatolii Mohyliov kastet til fordel for Sergej Aksjonov. Førstnevnte tilhørte Janukovytsjs parti, Regionpartiet, som hadde 80 representanter i parlamentet, mens den nye statsministerens prorussiske parti hadde tre. Deretter ble det vedtatt folkeavstemning.

To dager senere ba Aksionov offisielt om militær hjelp fra Russland for å «opprettholde ro og orden», selv om den russiske invasjonen allerede var et faktum. Kort tid etter ble Aksionov mottatt på rød løper i Moskva.

Opp mot folkeavstemningen ble opposisjon kneblet. Krimtataren Resat Amet kan tjene som eksempel. Den 3. mars demonstrerte han fredelig og alene mot invasjonen på torget i Simferopol, hvorpå han ble ført bort av tre uniformerte menn, formodentlig fra russisk etterretning. Den 15. mars ble Amet funnet drept med merker etter omfattende tortur.

På stemmesedlene 16. mars fikk velgerne to alternativer: Gå tilbake til Krims grunnlovsmessige status i 1992, eller bli innlemmet i Russland. De kunne ikke velge at Krim skulle fortsette å ha samme status i Ukraina som det hadde hatt siden 1998.

Det mest alvorlige i denne sammenhengen er selvfølgelig Russlands invasjon og påfølgende anneksjon uten aksept fra Ukraina. Man trenger ikke mye fantasi for å forstå hvor farlig det kan bli dersom Russlands fremgangsmåte skal gi presedens i Europa. For hva om det oppstod tumulter i Hviterussland og Russland invaderte de østlige områdene for å avholde folkeavstemning? Og hva med de østlige delene av Estland og Latvia, hvor brorparten anser seg som russere?

ANDRANIK MIGRANYAN, professor ved Moskvas statlige institutt for internasjonal politikk og med nære bånd til Kreml, hadde i 2014 et innlegg i den russiske avisa Isvestija. Her hevdet han at seierherrenes ydmykelse av Tyskland etter første verdenskrig kan sammenlignes med Vestens ydmykelse av Russland etter Sovjetunionens oppløsning, og fortsetter:

«Det er nødvendig å skille mellom Hitler før og etter 1939, for å separere fluer fra koteletter. Faktum er at Hitler forente Østerrike, Sudetland og Memel med Tyskland uten blodsutgytelse, og fullførte det Bismarck ikke klarte. Hadde Hitler stoppet der ville han ha blitt stående i historien som en av Tysklands største ledere.»

Slikt burde mane til refleksjon om Russlands egentlige motiver, også i Øst-Ukraina.

Bjørn Johan Berger

Foot Soldiers in a Shadowy Battle Between Russia and the West


May 28, 2017

MELNIK, Czech Republic — Working at his computer, as he does most weekends, on an anti-Western diatribe for a Czech website, Ladislav Kasuka was not sure what to make of the messages that began popping up on his Facebook page, offering him money to organize street protests.

“Do you need help?” read the first message, written in Russian, from a person he did not know. This was followed, in a mix of Russian and garbled Czech, by gushing encouragement for street demonstrations and increasingly specific offers of cash.

An initial payment of 300 euros ($368) was offered for Mr. Kasuka, a penniless Czech Stalinist, to buy flags and other paraphernalia for a protest rally in Prague, the Czech capital, against the NATO alliance and the pro-Western government in Ukraine. Later, he was offered €500 ($558) to buy a video camera, film the action and post the video online. Other small sums were also proposed.

“It was all a bit unusual, so I was surprised,” Mr. Kasuka recalled in a recent interview at a shopping mall north of Prague where he works on security and maintenance.

He decided the cash “was for a good cause” — halting the spread of NATO and capitalist Western ways into the formerly communist lands of Eastern Europe — so he accepted.

The strange relationship that followed, consisting of passionate social media exchanges about politics and a total of €1,500 in cash transfers, was one of many forged across Eastern and Central Europe in summer 2014. They were part of a frenetic, though often clumsy, influence campaign financed from Moscow and directed by Alexander Usovsky, a Belarus-born writer, Russian-nationalist agitator and ideological hired gun in a shadowy battle for hearts and minds between Russia and the West.

Compared with Russia’s supposed meddling in the recent presidential elections in France and the United States, the activities of Mr. Kasuka and those like him are of little consequence. He belongs firmly to the fringe of Czech politics, and has never aspired to any higher office than local councilor in Melnik, the town north of Prague where he lives with his girlfriend in a graffiti-smeared housing block.

Mr. Kasuka’s collaboration with Mr. Usovsky first came to light in a cache of emails, Facebook messages and other data pilfered by Ukrainian hackers from Mr. Usovsky’s computer. It provides a rare ground-level view of a particularly murky aspect of Russia’s influence strategy: freelance activists who promote its agenda abroad, but get their backing from Russian tycoons and others close to the Kremlin, not the Russian state itself.

Mr. Usovsky’s focus was on marginal political players in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and his efforts mostly fell flat. The protests organized by Mr. Kasuka and others attracted only handfuls of people. Pro-Russian websites that Mr. Usovsky helped to set up all fizzled. A Polish politician he was in touch with, Mateusz Piskorski, was arrested last year on suspicion of spying for Russia.

None of that seemed to deter Mr. Usovsky, who was still pitching wild plans and detailed budgets to potential backers in Moscow early this year.

His communications offer a revealing glimpse into Russian thinking, ambitions and frustrations. His dealings with the office of Konstantin Malofeev, a nationalist billionaire who was hit with sanctions by the United States over his alleged support for pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine, are especially notable.

After Mr. Usovsky managed to orchestrate only a few tiny demonstrations in Prague, Warsaw and other cities, an assistant to Mr. Malofeev demanded in October 2014 that Mr. Usovsky produce “a clear, concrete and realistic plan for the coming to power of pro-Russian forces.”

Mr. Malofeev declined to be interviewed, and his spokeswoman, Nadezhda Novoselova, said the billionaire and his staff had nothing to do with Mr. Usovsky.

Mr. Malofeev has acquired a reputation as the Kremlin’s version of George Soros, the Hungarian-American billionaire whom pro-Western forces across Eastern Europe often turn to for money. Unlike Mr. Soros, though, the wealthy Russians who support activists abroad generally try to keep their roles and spending secret. That allows the Kremlin to keep its distance as well.

Mr. Malofeev has in the past insisted he supported only humanitarian work, not political trouble-making.

Reports that Russia used cyberattacks and disinformation to meddle in the American election have persuaded many that Moscow runs a sophisticated influence machine. But interviews with several of Mr. Usovsky’s collaborators, and the contents of his hacked computer, suggest that it was at times a more shambolic affair, hampered by money squabbles, intramural rivalries and absurdly distorted views of how politics works outside Russia.

Jakub Janda, deputy director of European Values, a Western-financed research group in Prague that has tracked Russian influence campaigns, said that Mr. Usovsky seemed so far out of touch with reality that he might even be “a decoy” meant to make people say, “Look, this whole Russia threat thing is just not serious.”

Others, though, see Mr. Usovsky as evidence of Russia’s mastery of plausible deniability and its willingness to bet on opportunists, no matter how slim their chances of success.

Mr. Usovsky “is a good case study in Russian methods,” said Daniel Milo, a former official of the Slovakian Interior Ministry who is now an expert on extremism at Globsec, a research group in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. “He is a small cog in a big industry,” Mr. Milo said. “There may be dozens more.”

Mr. Usovsky declined to be interviewed for this article without being paid. But in response to emailed questions, he confirmed that his computer had been hacked, and he did not dispute the authenticity of the leaked messages.

A resident of Vitebsk, near the Russian border with Belarus, Mr. Usovsky started his operation in 2014, riding a wave of nationalist fervor in Moscow after the annexation of Crimea and the widespread belief among Russia’s political and business elite that united European backing for sanctions against Russia could be quickly dissolved.

He set up a network of websites in various languages to promote Slavic unity, rented an office in Bratislava and established a sham foundation nominally dedicated to promoting culture.

Asked by email how much money he had received from sponsors in Moscow, Mr. Usovsky initially denied receiving any. Then, when he was sent a copy of a message he had written in October 2014 detailing €100,000 he received to finance the “preparatory stage” of his work in Eastern Europe, he stopped responding to inquiries.

Other messages taken from his computer by hackers suggest that the money came from Mr. Malofeev. Mr. Usovsky badgered Mr. Malofeev’s assistant for hundreds of thousands more euros in late 2014 and 2015, to finance pro-Russian candidates in Polish elections.

Though he never even came close to bringing any pro-Russian groups to power, Mr. Usovsky was able to identify partners in Eastern and Central Europe ready to accept his help. He also showed a grasp of the internet’s power to amplify fringe voices and make thinly attended demonstrations seem like major dramas. He worked closely with state-controlled Russian news outlets to ensure that the activities of his Czech, Slovak and Polish collaborators received extensive coverage.

For example, Mr. Kasuka, the Czech Stalinist, has appeared regularly in Russian media as a commentator on Czech affairs and geopolitics. He once told RT that the United States might drop an atomic bomb on Ukraine and blame Russia to create a pretext for war. And a small rally that Mr. Kasuka organized in Prague was featured on Perviy Kanal, a major Russian TV channel.

“It is totally crazy,” said Roman Mica, an analyst based in Prague. “Pervy Kanal presents as serious news a protest by 10 or so people who are mostly ready for the psychological hospital.” He said Mr. Kasuka had become “one of the best known Czechs in Russia, after our hockey players.”

One person Mr. Usovsky did not want in the limelight, however, was himself. When a Slovak group, Peaceful Warrior, wanted to thank him publicly at a rally for his financial support, he swiftly vetoed the idea.

After Mr. Malofeev, his main backer, cooled on his ambitious but unrealistic political plans, Mr. Usovsky grew increasingly desperate for money. He told Mr. Malofeev’s assistant in March 2015 that his “Polish friends” needed €292,700 ($327,000) to win seats in Parliament. He also asked for €10,000 ($11,175) for Jobbik, a far-right Hungarian party, and €3,000 more for a neo-fascist paramilitary group called the Hungarian Guard.

Apparently rebuffed by Mr. Malofeev, he peppered other prospective Russian donors with detailed plans for a “pro-Russian fifth column,” claiming that he could destroy “Europe’s anti-Russian front” by channeling money to politicians who opposed NATO and the European Union. Among them were the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, headed by a former intelligence officer, and Konstantin Zatulin, a hard-line member of the Russian Parliament.

Short of funds, Mr. Usovsky looked to Mr. Kasuka, the Czech Stalinist, as a low-cost project that could keep him in the game. Unlike Mr. Usovsky’s Polish partners, Mr. Kasuka was not constantly asking for money, and had even turned some down when he ran for a seat on the Melnik town council in 2014.

But Mr. Kasuka lost interest in street politics. Though he is still in touch with Mr. Usovsky on social media, he says he now concentrates on his writings about the risk of war, Stalin’s achievements and the misery caused by capitalist exploitation.

“It does not matter to me whether money comes from the Kremlin or from America, so long as it helps the cause,” he said. “What matters is the idea.”

Correction: May 29, 2017
Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article referred incorrectly in one passage to requests made to Mr. Malofeev’s office for money to finance pro-Russian politicians in Polish elections. The requests came directly from Mr. Usovsky, not from an assistant.

Oleg Matsnev contributed reporting from Moscow, Hana de Goeij from Prague, and Miroslava Germanova from Bratislava, Slovakia.

Andrew Higgins

Russische Schläferzellen? Experte warnt vor russischen Kampfsportschulen in Deutschland


27. Mai 2017

Sicherheitsexperten warnen vor russischen Kampfsportschulen in Deutschland. Die 63 Clubs in deutschen Städten, die die Disziplin Systema lehren, hätten direkte oder indirekte Verbindungen zu russischen Geheimdiensten. Das ist deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden seit Jahren bekannt, doch nun gibt es Befürchtungen, die Rekruten könnten Störaktionen planen.

Bereits 2014 berichtete FOCUS, daß deutsche Staatsschützer die Systema-Schulen mit Sorge beobachten. Sie seien vom russischen Militärgeheimdienst GRU gesteuert und würden mit ihrer Kampfsport-Ausbildung gezielt Mitarbeiter von Polizei, Militär und Justiz ansprechen – mit einem klaren Ziel: Der Aufbau von Kontakten und das Anwerben von Informanten.

„Bei aller Liberalität können wir ein solches Sicherheitsrisiko nicht dulden“, sagte ein Verfassungsschützer zu FOCUS. Von 30 deutschen Städten, in denen Systema unterrichtet wird, war damals die Rede.

Geheimagenten in den Kampfsportclubs

Inzwischen ist die Situation eher noch brenzliger geworden, wie der Sicherheitsexperte Dmitrij Chmelnizki der Brüsseler Onlinezeitung „EUobserver“ berichtete. Der Artikel erschien auch bei der "HuffPost". Chmelnizki bezeichnete die inzwischen 63 Systema-Clubs in Deutschland als „Schläferzellen“ der russischen Geheimdienste GRU und FSB. Aus der Verknüpfung würden die Trainer keinen Hehl machen und offen Abzeichen und Symbole tragen.

„Nichts davon ist ein Geheimnis für die deutschen Behörden - hoffe ich zumindest“, so Chmelnizki. Er habe sich bei seinen Nachforschungen ausschließlich auf öffentliche Quellen gestützt. Seinen Informationen zufolge sind durchschnittlich drei bis fünf Agenten Teil einer jeden Trainingsgruppe – das seien insgesamt über 300 Personen mit Verbindungen zum russischen Geheimdienst.

Störaktionen zur Bundestagswahl?

Das Problem dabei sei, daß der Militärgeheimdienst GRU eine klare Doktrin für den Fall einer Auseinandersetzung Russlands mit der Nato habe: Attacken auf militärische und zivile Ziele und eine Terrorisierung der Bevölkerung. „Sie bauen Schläferzellen auf“, ist sich Chmelnizki sicher. Er sagte dem „EUobserver“, er befürchte verdeckte Aktionen zur deutschen Bundestagswahl im September.

„Sie könnten versuchen, die Situation zu destabilisieren“, spekulierte der Sicherheitsexperte. „Beispielweise könnten sie bei Demonstrationen gegen die Regierung zur Gewalt anstacheln oder Molotow-Cocktails auf Moscheen oder Flüchtlingsunterkünfte werfen.“ Die Systema-Schulen würden sich inzwischen auch in anderen EU-Staaten und auf dem Balkan ausbreiten.

Mehr als Cyberattacken?

Chmelnizki erklärte dem „EUobserver“ er sei auch deshalb mit seinen Erkenntnissen an die Öffentlichkeit gegangen, um durch die Aufmerksamkeit einen gewissen Schutz zu bekommen. „Ich habe bisher noch keine direkten Drohungen erhalten, doch ich weiß, mit wem ich es zu tun habe“, sagte er. Chmelnizki war 1987 vor dem FSB-Vorgänger KGB nach Westdeutschland geflohen.

Die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden wollten sich zu möglichen russischen Störaktion bei der Bundestagswahl nicht äußern. Eine Gefahr sehen viele Experten, dabei geht es aber vor allem um Cyberattacken. Außerhalb Deutschlands gehen GRU-Agenten hingegen direkter vor: So sollen sie beispielsweise in Ungarn und der Slowakei Neonazi-Gruppen im Nahkampf ausgebildet haben.

Russian spies allegedly recruit also Slovaks


May 24, 2017

They are using martial art clubs in Germany and dozens more in other EU states, in the Western Balkans, and in North America.

Russian intelligence services are reportedly using martial arts clubs to recruit potential troublemakers in Germany and other EU countries, the internet magazine EU Observer reported, citing several security experts.

The number of clubs is higher than previously reported and the “sleeper cells” could stage violent provocations ahead of the upcoming German elections, the EU Observer added.

The warnings come amid concerns by enemies of the Russian state who live in the EU that they could be harmed for their work, EU Observer writes.

The martial arts clubs, which teach an offensive style called “systema” have “direct or indirect” links to the GRU military intelligence or FSB domestic intelligence services in Russia, according to Dmitrij Chmelnizki, a scholar of Russian espionage who lives in Berlin.

He said the GRU is using these clubs to recruit agents in the West as it had done in the former East Germany during the Cold War.

His investigation found 63 systema clubs in Germany and dozens more in other EU states, in the Western Balkans, and in North America.

Chmelnizki said there were nine systema-type schools whose founders were “all officers of the GRU or KGB-FSB” and whose “intense” foreign expansion in the past 10 years had “no visible natural explanation”.

Their expansion looked like a “well-thought-out, large-scale operation of the secret services with powerful government funding”, he told EU Observer.

The Systema Ryabko school and the Systema Siberian Cossack school also had students in Slovakia.

Eerik Kross, who used to hunt Russian spies when he led Estonia’s security service, the Kapo, from 1995 to 2000, said EU authorities should pay more attention to physical threats posed by Russian intelligence.

Kross noted that GRU officers recently gave combat training to a neo-Nazi group in Hungary, the Hungarian National Front, and to similar groups in Slovakia, the Slovak Conscripts and the Slovak Revival Movement.

Chmelnizki, a 63-year old academic, fled from Russia to what was then West Germany in 1987 after being put on trial for doing research on the KGB, the former name of the FSB, EU Observer wrote.

He conducted his investigation of the systema clubs using open sources on the internet and working in collaboration with Viktor Suvorov, a former GRU officer who was posted in Geneva, Switzerland, during the Cold War before moving to the UK.

Fight club: Russian spies seek EU recruits


May 23, 2017

Russian intelligence services are using martial arts clubs to recruit potential troublemakers in Germany and other EU countries, security experts have warned.

The number of clubs is higher than previously reported and the “sleeper cells” could stage violent provocations ahead of the upcoming German elections, they said.

The warnings come amid concerns by enemies of the Russian state who live in the EU that they could be harmed for their work.

The martial arts clubs, which teach an offensive style called “systema”, all have “direct or indirect” links to the GRU military intelligence or FSB domestic intelligence services in Russia, according to Dmitrij Chmelnizki, a scholar of Russian espionage who lives in Berlin.

He said the GRU was using them to recruit agents in the West the same way that it used to when it had bases in the former East Germany in Cold War times.

His investigation found 63 systema clubs in Germany and dozens more in other EU states, in the Western Balkans, and in North America.

Many of the clubs publicly boasted that they had links to Russian special forces and used GRU or FSB insignia, such as images of bats or of St. George.

“None of this is a secret to the German authorities, I hope”, Chmelnizki said.

The 63-year old academic fled from Russia to the then West Germany in 1987 after being put on trial for doing research on the KGB, the former name of the FSB.

He conducted his investigation of the systema clubs using open sources on the internet. He also did it in collaboration with Viktor Suvorov, a former GRU officer who was posted in Geneva, Switzerland, during the Cold War before he moved to the UK.

Chmelnizki told EUobserver that based on an estimate of “approximately three to five agents on average for a training group”, the 63 clubs in Germany meant that the GRU’s fifth column there could number up to 315 recruits.

According to GRU doctrine, these agents could be used to attack targets such as military bases or civilian airports if war broke out with Nato, but they could also be ordered to create “general terror in the enemy’s rear” or “an atmosphere of suspicion, insecurity, and fear” in an enemy country’s population during peacetime.

“They are organising combat sleeper cells”, Chmelnizki said.

Looking ahead to the German elections in September, he said that Russian agents could try to start a cycle of racist violence during the vote. “They could be used to destabilise the situation, for instance by instigating violence during anti-government demonstrations, or by throwing molotov cocktails at a mosque or a migrant shelter”, he said.

He said the Systema Wolf school was of “special interest” because it was “developing very fast” in Europe.

It has, in just seven years, opened branches in Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Serbia, and Switzerland and it has created a German chapter of the Night Wolves, a Russian biker gang whose leader is friends with Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Chmelnizki said the Systema RMA school appeared to be targeting recruits inside German security services.

He noted that five alumni from its club in Bonn were from Germany’s special police, for instance.

Chmelnizki said he wanted to speak out because he felt unsafe and because the publicity might help to protect him.

“So far, I have not had any clear threats, but I know who I’m dealing with”, he told EUobserver.

“The GRU feels just as at home today in united Germany as it used to in the former USSR”, he said.

A previous investigation by Boris Reitschuster, a German journalist, published last year, also said the GRU was using systema clubs to recruit agents.

It cited a classified report by a Western intelligence service, which said the GRU had recruited 250 to 300 agents in Germany and that the foreign service was surprised the German authorities had done nothing to stop it.

An earlier report by Focus, a German magazine, said there were systema clubs in 30 German cities and that the BfV, the country’s domestic intelligence service, saw them as a security threat.

A recent documentary by Germany's ZDF broadcaster also raised the alarm on Chechen agents.

A senior FSB officer who quit the service in 2008 told ZDF that the FSB had used martial arts clubs in Chechnya, a Russian province, to recruit men whom it later sent to Germany posing as refugees.

The Chechen “sleepers” could be “given any kind of order,” said the FSB officer, who asked to remain anonymous.

EUobserver contacted the largest systema school, Systema Ryabko, for a comment on Chmelnizki and Reitschuster’s allegations.

It said by email from its office in Toronto, Canada, without giving the name of the respondent: “The allegations you heard are a fruit of someone's malicious imagination and are completely false”.

German elections

With the German election four months away, the GRU already stands accused of trying to meddle in the outcome by hacking German MPs.

“We recognise this [cyber attack] as a campaign being directed from Russia”, the BfV director, Hans-Georg Massen, said at a conference in Potsdam, Germany, on 5 May.

“Whether they do it [use the hacked material] or not is a political decision ... that I assume will be made in the Kremlin”, he said.

German intelligence and police services declined to comment if they thought that Russian intelligence services posed a physical threat as well as a digital one.

“We do not disclose our security concepts”, a Berlin police spokesman said.

Stefan Meister, a German expert on Russia, said Russian intelligence was targeting Germany as part of a wider anti-EU campaign, but he said it was unlikely that the Kremlin would go beyond propaganda and cyber operations.

Meister, from the German Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank in Berlin, told EUobserver that the Russian general staff and intelligence services first discussed how to counter Western influence after anti-Putin protests in Russia in 2011 and 2012.

He said Putin, who is a former FSB director, felt “under attack” by the West, whom the Russian leader blamed for organising the rallies.

“The Kremlin discussed how to fight back, how to meddle in our societies, how to manipulate public debate, how to exploit EU weaknesses to disable the EU,” Meister said. 

He said Germany was a “target” because it backed EU sanctions on Russia and because it was vital to EU economic and political stability.

Meister, who took part in the ZDF documentary, added that there was “speculation” in “expert circles” in Germany that either Putin or Ramzan Kadyrov, the governor of Chechnya, could use Chechen agents to “influence the Muslim community in Europe and support them in organising terrorist attacks”.

But he added: “That is not the way the Russian security forces work. They want to weaken the [German] system, show its weaknesses, but they don't want to organise some kind of coup”.

There was “panic and overestimation” in terms of “what the Russians were capable of”, he said.

Another Russia expert disagreed.

Eerik-Niiles Kross, who used to hunt Russian spies when he led Estonia’s security service, the Kapo, from 1995 to 2000, said that an anti-government rally in Berlin last year already “bore the hallmarks” of a “special operation” by Russian intelligence that was designed to influence German politics.

The International Convention of German-Russians, a Berlin-based group that denies having links to the Kremlin, put 700 men and women on the street outside German chancellor Angela Merkel’s office on 23 January last year.

It called on anti-Muslim and neo-Nazi extremists to join them via Facebook.

It held the rally in conjunction with a Kremlin-sponsored propaganda campaign about fake allegations that migrants had raped a Russian girl.

’Systematic, aggressive’

Germany aside, Chmelnizki’s investigation showed that GRU and FSB-linked martial arts clubs have also mushroomed elsewhere in Europe.

He said there were nine systema-type schools whose founders were “all officers of the GRU or KGB-FSB” and whose “intense” foreign expansion in the past 10 years had “no visible natural explanation”.

The expansion looked like a “well-thought-out, large-scale operation of the secret services with powerful government funding”, he said.

The Systema Ryabko school, for instance, has branches in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK as well as Germany.

The Systema Siberian Cossack school has students in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK.

Another systema school associated with Vadim Starov, whom Chmelnizki described as “a GRU officer who only formally retired”, has branches in Cyprus, Greece, and Italy and was the “most blatant” in its use of GRU insignia and slogans, he said.

Kross, the former Kapo chief from Estonia, said EU authorities should pay more attention to Russian intelligence "special operations".

He noted that GRU officers recently gave combat training to a neo-Nazi group in Hungary, the Hungarian National Front, and to similar groups in Slovakia, the Slovak Conscripts and the Slovak Revival Movement.

He also said the GRU tried to stage an anti-Nato coup in Montenegro last year.

Looking at the GRU-alleged cyber attacks on German elections, he said special operations were more “aggressive” and “dangerous”.

“A cyber attack can cause a lot of damage, but this requires posting a team of covert operatives to the target country”, he said.

“Russia’s recent use of special operations in Europe seems to be more than just a list of random incidents. There’s a systematic increase and it’s going on not just in the Western Balkans, but also in the rest of Europe,” Kross said.

Mark Galeotti, a British expert on Russia, told EUobserver that Russian intelligence sometimes outsourced tasks to Russian organised crime groups in Europe to conceal its hand.

“There is evidence that some Russian-based organised crime groups are sometimes contracted by Russian intelligence to carry out certain acts,” he said.

Galeotti, from the Institute of International Relations in Prague, said in a report out in April that Russian criminals in Germany were doing “mundane” tasks for Russian spies, such as “simple surveillance” or delivering “materials or messages”.

He said the GRU and FSB used the Russian mafia “to raise operational funds for active political measures [bribes] in Europe that had no Russian ‘fingerprints’ on them”.

Pointing to the GRU combat training in Hungary and to the GRU-alleged coup in Montenegro, he said the mafia could also help the Kremlin’s fifth column in Europe to carry out more serious attacks if hostilities broke out.

The Russian mafia’s “capacity … to smuggle weapons and military equipment” into the EU would be “of particular use to the Kremlin”, Galeotti said.

Putin’s list

Chmelnizki was not the only enemy of Putin living in Europe who did not feel protected by the EU or Nato border.

Egmont Koch, who made the ZDF documentary on Chechen agents, told EUobserver that the former FSB officer to whom he spoke wanted to remain anonymous because he feared reprisals.

A list of Kremlin-alleged killings on Western territory in recent times would include Alexander Litvinenko, an FSB defector, who was poisoned in the UK in 2006, and Alexander Peripilichny, an anti-FSB whistleblower, who died suddenly in the UK in 2012, among others.

The sudden deaths in Germany of two top MPs on Russia relations – Philipp Missfelder in 2015 and Andreas Schockenhoff in 2014 – also prompted conspiracy theories.

Meister, from the German think tank, told EUobserver that he knew Missfelder and that the MP had been in poor health, but said some of his associates felt that the two deaths “couldn’t be normal”.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a former Russian oil chief who fell out with Putin and who fled to the UK, also told this website that EU states should pay more attention to physical threats posed by Russian intelligence.

He added, echoing Galeotti, that if the Russian regime wanted to kill him, it would probably outsource it to Chechen criminals in Austria.

Khodorkovsky said that Russian intelligence services had a list of people in Europe “whose death would be a pleasant thing for Putin and his circle”.

“The list is not that short. It’s not hundreds of people either, but even if you killed just 10 people that would make everyone else think,” he said, referring to intimidation of Putin’s adversaries in the West.

“The West stopped thinking about Russian special operations about 30 years ago [when the USSR fell], but it needs to understand and view this threat differently today,” he said.

Correction on 26 May 2017: The article incorrectly stated that Andreas Schockenhoff died in 2015. In fact, he died in 2014.

Andrew Rettman