The readers' editor on… pro-Russia trolling below the line on Ukraine stories

www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/04/pro-russia-trolls-ukraine-guardian-online

4 May 2014

Guardian moderators, who deal with 40,000 comments a day, believe there is an orchestrated pro-Kremlin campaign

Trolling covers a multitude of sins but a particularly nasty strain has emerged in the midst of the armed conflict in Ukraine, which infests comment threads on the Guardian and elsewhere, despite the best efforts of moderators. Readers and reporters alike are concerned that these are from those paid to troll, and to denigrate in abusive terms anyone criticising Russia or President Vladimir Putin.

One complaint came to the readers' editor's office on 6 March. "In the past weeks [I] have become incredibly frustrated and disillusioned by your inability to effectively police the waves of Nashibot trolls who've been relentlessly posting pro-Putin propaganda in the comments on Ukraine v Russia coverage.

"... the quantity of pro-Kremlin trolling on this topic … which has been documented extensively since 2012 as a real and insidious threat to online communities of idea and debate, has rendered commenting on these articles all but meaningless, and a worthless exercise in futility and frustration for anyone not already being mind-controlled by the Kremlin."

On 23 April the writer complained again: "One need only pick a Ukraine article at random, pick any point in the comments at random, and they will find themselves in a sea of incredibly aggressive and hostile users (the most obvious have accounts created since February 2014 … but there also exist those who registered with the Guardian before the high point of the crisis) who post the most biased, inciteful [sic] pro-Kremlin, anti-western propaganda that seems as if it's taken from a template, so repetitive are the statements. Furthermore, these comments are consistently capturing inordinate numbers of 'recommends', sometimes on the order of 10 to 12 times what pro-Ukrainian comments receive."

Luke Harding, the Guardian's highly experienced former Moscow correspondent, who was expelled in 2011, is in no doubt about the nature of the campaign and how damaging it is to debate in the threads. From Ukraine, he said: "It's a well-attested phenomenon in Russia."

On 7 February 2012 the Guardian reported: "A pro-Kremlin group runs a network of internet trolls, seeks to buy flattering coverage of Vladimir Putin and hatches plans to discredit opposition activists and media, according to private emails allegedly hacked by a group calling itself the Russian arm of Anonymous.

"The group has uploaded hundreds of emails it says are to, from and between Vasily Yakemenko, the first leader of the youth group Nashi [and] now head of the Kremlin's Federal Youth Agency, its spokeswoman, Kristina Potupchik, and other activists. The emails detail payments to journalists and bloggers, the group alleges."

At the time no one from the group was prepared to confirm or deny the veracity of the emails, which were sent between November 2010 and December 2011. Harding said that it was obvious the trolling on Ukraine-related issues was organised, as the trolls "are given talking points" and certain phrases were used again and again. The complainant to the Guardian said: "They still post only extremely biased, offensive, trolling commentary – including insulting your correspondent, Luke Harding, whom they libel as a 'Russian hater' and mock as 'Luke Happyman'."

One comment read: "Yes, sir. You are certainly correct. Sometimes I wonder how many of the top people in the new rightwing pro-Nato Guardian are privately educated. I imagine that Russian-hater Luke Happyman was but do get some state-educated sxcum [sic] as well. Still, if anyone knows, please inform us before the censorious moderators get to work again (again)."

In fairness there is no conclusive evidence about who is behind the trolling, although Guardian moderators, who deal with 40,000 comments a day, believe there is an orchestrated campaign. Harding, who is inured to the abuse, would simply like better systems to deal with it, as would the moderation and community teams.

A senior moderator said: "We can look at the suspicious tone of certain users, combined with the date they signed up, the time they post and the subjects they post on. Zealous pro-separatist comments in broken English claiming to be from western counties are very common, and there's a list of tropes we've learnt to look out for. These posts may be suspicious but it's when the content of them breaks our community standards that we will step in.

"A larger problem on these threads is users accusing each other of being "bots", "trolls" or "astroturfers", usually wrongly. These accusations do break the community standards (they're essentially abusive statements) and moderators take a hand here. We will also, obviously, act against abusive statements at the expense of our writers, of which Luke receives a substantial number. Those are more likely to be the reason for us taking action on these threads. It's only when an account crosses those lines that we step in."

Here are three Ukraine-related stories and the numbers of comments listed and removed for reasons of abuse.

• http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/28/ukraine-journalists-media-freedom: 171 comments listed, real figure: 244 (74 removed)

• http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/27/ukraine-donetsk-pro-russian-forces-seize-tv-station-parade-captives: 2,149 listed, real figure: 2,310 (161 removed)

• http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/27/ukraine-kidnapped-observers-slavyansk-vyacheslav-ponomarev: 2,004 listed, real figure 2,263 (259 removed)

The final word goes to Luke Harding: "It is not Comment is free, but rather Comment is paid for."

Chris Elliott

Ryssland vill förbjuda Karlsson på taket

http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=478&artikel=5851388

2 maj 2014

Astrid Lindgrens lagom runde och aningen självgode figur Karlsson på taket är mycket populär i Ryssland. Men nu vill det ryska utbildningsdepartementet förbjuda utländsk barnlitteratur som anses opatriotisk och i strid med traditionella familjevärderingar. Och där ligger Karlsson i farozonen. Nyligen diskuterades ett eventuellt förbud i rysk tv.

– De anser att den kände Karlsson i Astrid Lindgrens bok skapar oönskade dåliga relationer mellan barn och föräldrar och är inte i linje med ryska värderingar, säger programledaren som bjudit in fyra att diskutera det förbud tjänstemän vid utbildningsdepartementet förberett.

Tre av fyra i panelen är för ett förbud av framförallt det som de ser som skadliga utländska influenser, som inte fanns på Sovjettiden.

– Sagor om jultomten, Musse Pigg och Kalle Anka måste absolut förbjudas och allt det amerikanska som inte fanns på Sovjettiden, säger Kommunistpartiets Viktor Nikolajevitj, som vill ha bort allt utländskt i barnlitteraturen.

Den ende som inte håller med i panelen om förslaget från utbildningsministeriet är barnlitteraturexperten Valentin Valentinovitj.

– Det där härrör från bristande klassisk bildning för alla sagor innehåller universella teman som går igen oavsett land, så  förbjuds utländska sagor måste också ryska sagor förbjudas , säger han.

Astrid Lindgren är mycket populär i Ryssland och särskilt Karlsson på taket, som fanns översatt till ryska redan på Sovjettiden och förutom böckerna har en rad dramatiseringar gjorts om den lagom runde flygande och något självgode Karlsson.

I den patriotiska våg som råder i Ryssland just nu diskuteras förutom förbud för skadligt utländsk inflytande att skapa egna ryska alternativ. Ett internet som kallas Tjeburasjka eller Drutten som figuren heter på svenska har föreslagits av en dumaledamot och presidenten själv har sagt att det behövs rysk snabbmat istället för importerad amerikansk.

Russia Has Deported Four Americans for “propagandizing American values”

www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray/russia-says-it-has-deported-four-americans

April 25, 2014

Four Americans have been fined and deported from Russia and accused of “propagandizing American values,” according to a statement from the federal migration service of the Russian Republic of Chuvashia.

The Americans were all teaching English in the city of Cheboksary while on tourist visas, the statement said. Their deportation comes at a time of heightened tensions with Russia, as the U.S. has declared that Moscow broke the terms of an agreement over Ukraine reached in Geneva last week and is said to be preparing new sanctions.

“On April 24 and 25, employees of the Russian Federal Migration Service in the Chuvashia Republic detained 4 citizens of the United States of America, who arrived in the Russian Federation with the goal of tourism,” the statement reads. “During practically their whole time being in the city of Cheboksary they taught English to students of the foreign language faculty at the Chuvashsky government Yakovlev pedagogical university, propagandizing American values.”

“The decision of the judge of the Lenin District Court of the city of Cheboksary found these citizens guilty of committing an administrative offense under part 2, article 18.8 of the Russian Administrative Code,” the statement continues. “An administrative fine of 2,000 rubles was imposed on them with administrative expulsion from the borders of the Russian Federation in the form of independent controlled movement across the border of the Russian Federation.”

One of the Americans is singled out in the statement as a former Peace Corps volunteer: “One of the detained first came to Russia in 2001 as a Peace Corps volunteer. It is known that in 2002 Peace Corps activity was banned in connection with the carrying out of intelligence-subversive activities.”

“We are aware of reports that four U.S. citizens have been detained on work visa violations,” a State Department official said. “The Department of State takes its obligation to assist U.S. citizens abroad seriously, and stands ready to provide all appropriate consular services to U.S. citizens in need. Due to privacy considerations, we are unable to comment further.”

Putin: Internet är ett CIA-projekt

http://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2014/04/24/putin-internet-ar-ett-cia-projekt

Publicerad 24.04.2014 - 23:37. Uppdaterad 25.04.2014 - 00:03

Rysslands president Vladimir Putin kallar internet för ett CIA-projekt och varnar ryssar att använda sökmotorn Google.

Under en föreläsning för unga journalister sade Putin att CIA har övervakat internet allt sedan det skapades. Alla sökingar på Google går via USA och lagras där, sade han.

Putin lät också förstå att Rysslands populäraste sökmotor Jandeks snart kan komma att granskas av myndigheterna. Jandeks är delvis registrerat i utlandet och enligt Putin kan det finnas andra än skattemässiga orsaker till det.

Med Jandeks görs cirka 60 procent av internetsökningarna i Ryssland. Programmet används också i flera andra länder.

De ryska medierna bevakas i stor mån av statsledningen, så den politiska diskussionen förs främst på internet. Under den senaste tiden har Ryssland begränsat internetfriheten genom en lag som ger regeringen rätt att stänga ner webbsidor utan ett domstolsbeslut.

Den här veckan klubbade parlamentet en lag som kräver att sociala medieföretag har sina servrar i Ryssland och att de sparar alla data i minst ett halvår. Vidare framskrider en lag som kommer att tvinga bloggare att följa samma regler som medierna om den genomförs.

Kommentarer

Putin / internet

Inlagt av Ryska Björnen (ej verifierad) 25.04.2014 - 00:07

Hmm, nu har det spårat ur fullständigt för Putin, jag ställer frågan är han allvarligt psyksjuk? Paranoid? Förföljelsemani? Det brukar sluta så för dom som är maktfullkomliga diktatorer, det övergår till storhetsvansinne. Det är väl ingen som har tvingat honom att använda internet om han inte vill använda det. Eller håller det på och går utför, slutet nära förestående.

En som ser en ytterst labil envåldshärskare.

Barn i finska skolor får inte modersmålsundervisning på svenska

http://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2014/04/23/barn-i-finska-skolor-far-inte-modersmalsundervisning-pa-svenska

Publicerad 23.04.2014 - 05:28. Uppdaterad 23.04.2014 - 07:13

Modersmålsinrikad svenska är sällsynt i de finska skolorna. Johanna Nuorteva är mamma till tre tvåspråkiga barn. Hon är så bekymrad över hur det ska gå med deras svenska att hon lagt in ett klagomål hos justitieombudsmannen.

- Vi anmälde vårt första barn till förskolan på finska sidan. Jag märkte att när han börjar i skolan på ettan så får han inte någon undervisning på sitt officiella modersmål. Vi är tvåspråkiga, jag pratar finska med barnen och mannen pratar svenska. Vi skulle förstås vilja att barnen skulle få stöd och undervisning på båda språken, säger Nuorteva.

Hon är orolig för att den svenska skolan inte håller samma standard som den finska, hon vill att hennes barn ska undervisas av behöriga lärare. Största orsaken till att barnen sätts i finsk skola är ändå att de då får en kortare skolväg. Vännerna är också viktiga, gemenskapen bland grannarna är stor i Majstad i Helsingfors där hon bor.

- Vi hade först tänkt sätta honom i svenska skolan, men vi fick inte plats i svenskt dagis. Det var helt proppfullt på vårt område, så det blev ett jättebra dagis på finska.

Frustrerande att läsa sitt modersmål som främmande språk

Johanna Nuorteva har nu lagt in ett klagomål till justitieombudsmannen. Hon jobbar själv som lärare på Kivimäki skola i Vanda, där det går många barn som har ett annat modersmål än finska, och får modersmålsundervisning i sitt hemspråk. Hon undrar varför de tvåspråkiga barnen som talar svenska och finska inte har samma rättighet. Svenskundervisningen börjar först på tredje klass, och då med alla andra barn i skolan.

- Det är frustrerande att studera svenska i en grupp där alla andra har det som en främmande språk, och inte kan tala, skriva eller ens förstå. Jag vet inte vad svenskspråkiga barn får ut av det, säger Nuorteva.

Johanna Nuorteva är inte den enda som efterlyser modersmålsinriktad svenska. Svensklärarna i Finland r.f. vill att den skall bli lika allmän som den modersmålsinriktade finskan i de svenska skolorna.

Förbundet för svensklärare vill i ett utlåtande påminna om att de svenskspråkiga barnen som går i finskspråkiga skolor har rätt att delta i modersmålsinriktad svenska. Det sker alltför sällan idag. Beslut om undervisningen görs på kommunal nivå, och det finns inte ordentlig statistik över hur tvåspråkiga barn som går i finskspråkiga skolor.

Svensklärarna i Finland r.f. föreslår att undervisningen kunde skötas på distans om grupperna blir för små. Förbundet har talat om saken med Nomadskolan som idag ansvarar för den undervisning som finlandssvenska barn får utomlands.

I statsrådets nationalspråksstrategi för regeringsperioden 2011 -2015 står det att möjligheter att erbjuda modersmålssvenska skall utredas av Undervisnings- och kulturministeriet.

Letterna i städerna nära ryska gränsen känner sig utsatta

http://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2014/04/23/letterna-i-staderna-nara-ryska-gransen-kanner-sig-utsatta

Publicerad 23.04.2014 - 09:00. Uppdaterad 23.04.2014 - 11:11

I östra Lettland stiger oron för att propaganda från Ryssland ska öka motsättningarna mellan den lettiska och den ryskspråkiga befolkningsgruppen. I staden Daugavpils talar bara var sjätte invånare lettiska, och många av dem känner att attityderna mot dem har hårdnat. På kvällarna tycker många ungdomar att det är obehagligt att röra sig på stan.

Baren Artilerijas Pagrabi har bara varit öppen i ett halvår, men policyn att personalen endast talar lettiska har blivit en succé bland stadens lettiska ungdomar.

I början väckte klubbens språkpolicy inte så mycket reaktioner, men efter att dörrvakterna en gång kastade ut en berusad rysk kund började aggressiva kommentarer dyka upp på internet.

- Alla i personalen kan tala ryska, men vi har vår policy för att bevisa att bra mänskor inte har problem med att anpassa sitt språk efter miljön, säger klubbens ägare Andrejs Faibusevics.

Det som oroar de gäster jag talar med i baren under kvällens lopp är att en del av de lokala ryska ungdomarna ska radikaliseras ännu mer. Det känns som om den ryska propagandan redan har lyckats väcka känslorna för ett stor-Ryssland, säger ett par ungdomar, utan att riktigt kunna lägga fingret på varför de tror det.

Majoriteten av gästerna i baren föddes i början av 1990-talet, då andelen ryskspråkiga var ännu större än idag eftersom det sovjetiska flygvapnet hade en bas här. Idag lockar stadens universitet ungdomar från hela Lettland, men den trenden kan nu brytas.

- Jag har alltid en tårgasflaska i min handväska, säger Kristine, som har vuxit upp på landsbygden utanför Daugavpils, en helt lettiskspråkig miljö. Det händer ibland att någon skriker efter en, titta, där är några letter. Så har det förstås alltid varit, tillägger hon, det är inget nytt.

På Daugavpils gator syns inga tecken på någon pyrande konflikt, förutom att de två språkgrupperna i stort håller sig för sig själva. Det här är landets näst största stad, men staden är fattig, vilket många av invånarna beskyller regeringen i Riga för. Förra veckan kom Lettlands förre president Valdis Zatlers med obekräftade uppgifter om att Ryssland håller på att kartlägga stämningarna i östra Lettland.

- Jag tror inte att Ryssland planerar något liknande som det de har gjort i Ukraina och på Krim, säger Andis Kudors, chef för tankesmedjan Centret för östeuropeiska politikstudier, men de kan använda den information de samlar för att skapa spänningar i gränsområdena.

- Det finns inga etniska konflikter mellan ryssar och letter, men Ryssland utnyttjar spänningarna för att underminera vår integrationspolitik, menar Kudors.

Bland de lettiska ungdomarna känner många att de är mer utsatta nu än tidigare, men få tror ändå att något dramatiskt kommer att hända.

- Det här är ingenting vi talar om, säger Aigars Soldans, som de senaste snart två åren har bott i Moskva, vi har annat att tala om med kompisarna. Det är fortfarande bra här i Daugavpils.

Aigars ryska fru Daria tycker däremot att det märks att många är skärrade, som till exempel Aigars släktingar, som nu oroar sig mer än tidigare.

- Igår när vi var hemma hos Aigars mamma nämnde hon krisen i Ukraina och allt som nu händer, jag kunde se att det gör ont i hans familj.

Gustaf Antell

Germany Helped Prep Russia for War, U.S. Sources Say

www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/22/germany-helped-prep-russia-for-war-u-s-sources-say.html

April 22, 2014

Over the past few years, NATO countries have helped Russia revolutionize its armed forces. Now questions are arising about a German defense contractor that trained the Russian military.

The world was shocked when Russian special operations forces invaded Crimea with advanced technology, drastically improved operations, and with so much operational security that even agencies in the U.S. intelligence community didn’t see it coming. In Washington, government and congressional leaders are wondering how the Russian special operations forces got so good, so fast, without anyone noticing. Some are wondering how much help Russia had from the West.

In 2011, for example, the German defense contractor Rheinmetall signed a $140 million contract to build a combat simulation training center in Mulino, in southwest Russia, that would train 30,000 Russian combat troops per year. While the facility wasn't officially scheduled to be completed until later this year, U.S. officials believe that Germany has been training Russian forces for years.

Rheinmetall defended the project even after the invasion of Crimea, up until the German government finally shut it down late last month. But many tracking the issue within the U.S. government were not happy with Germany's handling of the Russian contract, and worry that some of the training may have gone to the kind of special operations forces now operating in and around Ukraine.

“It’s unfortunate that German companies were directly supporting and training Russia’s military even during the attacks against Ukraine,” one senior Senate aide told The Daily Beast. “The U.S. government should call on our NATO allies to suspend all military connections with Russia at this point, until the Russians leave Ukraine, including Crimea.”

According to the Congressional Research Service, Rheinmetall’s partner in the deal was the Russian state-owned Oboronservis (“Defense Service”) firm. The training center, modeled after one used by the German Bundeswehr, was to be “the most advanced system of its kind worldwide.” Reinmetall saw the contract as a precursor to several more projects “in light of the plans to modernize the equipment of the Russian armed forces.”

U.S. officials, now looking back, are privately expressing anger and frustration about the German work with the Russian military. While definitive proof is hard to come by, these officials look at the radical upgrade of Moscow’s forces–especially its special operations forces–experienced since they last saw major action in 2008's invasion of Georgia. The U.S. officials believe that some of the German training over the last few years was given to the GRU Spetsnaz, the special operations forces that moved unmarked into Crimea and who can now be found stirring up trouble in eastern Ukraine.

“People are pissed,” one U.S. intelligence official told The Daily Beast. “The chatter inside the Pentagon is that the training they were providing was going to Spetznaz.”

Rheinmetall did not respond to a request for comment.

Russia maintains close economic ties with many NATO states–especially Germany. By some estimates, the country exported nearly $50 billion in goods to Russia in 2013. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of German jobs depend on Russian trade.

The armed forces of NATO members have also been working with their counterparts in the Russian military, on and off, for years. Russia has held joint military exercises with both Germany and the U.S., for example. America has bought Russian helicopters to use in Afghanistan. And Moscow allows NATO equipment to pass through Russian territory as the gear comes into and out of the war zone.

To the Congressional Research Service, “Rheinmetall’s construction of an army training center could be viewed in the context of the broader bilateral defense cooperation between Germany and Russia,” the service writes in its report. “The German…  government’s approval of the contract to construct a training center also appears to be in line with long-standing German policy to promote military training and joint exercises with partner countries.”

But some on Capitol Hill see the Rheimetall contract as only one example of the folly of several NATO countries that rushed to sign lucrative defense contracts with Russia after President Obama declared a new “reset” policy with the Russian Federation. Lawmakers have tried to halt the French sale of the Mistral, an amphibious warship, to the Russian Navy. Some are also unhappy about the Italian sale of Lynx armored personnel carriers to Russia.

A Senate aide said that one of Rheinmetall’s contributions was to help the Russian army and GRU Spetznaz upgrade their gear. Reports show that the Russian military units both inside Ukraine and amassed on its eastern border are sporting brand new communications equipment, body armor, personal weapons, and ammunition. Taken together, it gives them a huge tactical advantage over the beleaguered Ukrainian armed forces.

Top defense officials are now acknowledging that Russia’s military has been revolutionized in recent years. This month, Vice Admiral Frank Pandolfe, the director for strategic plans and policy for the military’s joint chiefs of staff, told Congress in open testimony that in recent years Russia has created regional commands that “coordinate and synchronize planning, joint service integration, force movement, intelligence support, and the tactical employment of units” in what he deemed “snap exercises,” or military training missions that can be ordered at a moment’s notice. 

In the testimony, Pandolfe also said Russia has placed greater emphasis on the use of Special Operations Forces as well as information and cyber warfare.  Experts said that Russian military doctrine was dramatically updated in the past few years and clearly set out Russia’s plans for modernization and a focus on highly trained rapid reaction special forces. But in the West, the papers were not well read, much less understood.

The Russians also changed their doctrine to reflect that they viewed the threat as not coming from a conventional war, but from the need to protect Russian populations in unstable states facing what they deemed to be Western aggression.

“This wasn’t just about implementing lessons learned from [the 2008 invasion of] Georgia, it was about giving them a basis for a different kind of operations,” said Fiona Hill, a former top intelligence official on Russia, now with the Brookings Institution. “We should have been paying more attention to this. There have been these signals for a long time, but we have been misreading them.”

Western and NATO countries believed they could tie Russia into greater military cooperation through engagement, but now have realized that Russian was probably never really interested in that. The Russian military is now organized to respond to conflicts caused by such things as popular revolutions, political crises, and domestic insurgencies.

“Everyone was looking for a way to cooperate with the Russian military and rushed to find ways to do it, including us,” said Hill. “Whatever we do now, we have to be mindful that the Russians have been preparing for something else.”

Andranik Migranyan, a past member of Russia’s Presidential Council and currently an adviser to the Vladimir Putin administration, told reporters that ever since the Georgia war, Russia has been spending to radically upgrade its military, but that the West has only itself to blame for not following along.

“We have new armament, new army, new training,” he said. “It’s very strange you are not following what’s happening.”

Betrayal of Ukraine in Geneva: ‘Worse than Munich,’ Illarionov Says

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/04/window-on-eurasia-betrayal-of-ukraine.html

April 18, 2014

Staunton, April 18 – What the US, the EU and Ukraine itself agreed to in Geneva is “worse than Munich” because Kyiv joined in giving international sanction to actions of the Russian aggressor and opening the way for the transformation of the internal arrangements of Ukraine regardless of what Ukrainians want, according to Andrey Illarionov.

            As bad as the Munich accord of 1938 was – and it has long been a synonym for the appeasement of an aggressor -- the Russian commentator continues, at least the Czechoslovaks at that time were not forced to participate in it and agree to the dismemberment and redesign of their country  (aillarionov.livejournal.com/675700.html).

            And because Czechoslovakia was not invited to Munich, its people considered that they had been betrayed. Now, Illarionov suggests, Ukrainians must “wake up” to the horrible reality that they have been betrayed not just by the West but by their own government and are now very much on their own.

            In his words, the accord shows that “Putin has received everything he wanted” or “even more,” the commentator says, and then outlines his reasons for that devastating conclusion.

            First, he says, “Ukraine has de facto agree to ‘foreign administration’” because it has agreed that outside forces, the West and Russia, even though both have failed to fulfill their obligations under the Budapest Memorandum, the West by backing away from insisting that Russia respect it and Russia by openly violating it.

            Second, the Geneva accord says nothing about the removal from the territory of Ukraine “Russian forces, including the special forces of the GRU, FSB, Special Operations Forces and others.” The silence of the agreement on that point “de facto” legalizes their presence; they will certainly remain.

            Third, Illarionov points out, the document “says nothing about Russian aggression,” “not a word about the war that has been conducted by the Putin regime against Ukraine.”  Moscow and perhaps others will treat that as a legalization and legitimation of Russian aggression, and that in turn may open the way to more of it.

            Fourth, the Geneva agreement says nothing about the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  Given that Russia has already annexed Crimea, Moscow’s violation of the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine has been “legalized” not just by the West but by Kyiv as well.

            Fifth, Illarionov continues, there is “not a word” in the document about Crimea, a shortcoming that Moscow will see as a legitimation of its annexation. Sixth, the accord’s words about the participation of Ukraine’s regions in the constitutional development of the country in effect “gives a legal basis for the separatists to block the unitary character of the Ukrainian state.”

            Seventh, the accord gives “all the separatists” an amnesty. Eighth, its call for the liberation of all building and institutions and the disarming of “’self-defense’” forces should have been done anyway, but now those who seized these buildings will walk away unpunished and invited to take part in the political process.

            Ninth, Illarionov continues, the accord presupposes that Ukraine will become a federal state  -- even though such a development “does not enjoy any significant public support in any region of Ukraine” but only reflects what Moscow wants. Tenth, that sets the stage for more Crimeas and the creeping dismemberment of Ukraine.

            Eleventh, “the result of the process of federalization” will not be a federal Ukraine but rather the creation of a “Novorossiya (‘from Kharkhiv to Odessa’) about which Putin spoke so inspiringly” the same day this accord was being signed.

            Twelfth, the agreement does not guarantee the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections, a fact that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stressed and one that means that “the Russian powers will continue to undermine them ... and say that the authorities in Kyiv are illegitimate, as Putin said” again on the same day the accord was signed.

            Thirteenth, “according to the document,” Illarionov says, all “serious organized forces capable of opposing Russian aggression” such as the Maidan Self-Defense groups and the Right Sector will be disarmed and disbanded, leaving Ukraine without anyone to defend it given the weakness of the Ukrainian army and militia.

            Fourteenth, because the document requires the disbanding of such units, any use of force by pro-Moscow groups against them, an action that was a violation of national and international law before Geneva has now become “perfectly legal” and thus can be expected.

            Fifteenth, there is no reason to think that Russia will live up to the provisions of this accord any more than it did the Budapest Memorandum but both Russia and the West will insist that Ukraine do, something that will further unbalance the playing field against Ukraine and Ukrainians.

            Sixteenth, despite polls showing that a majority of Ukrainians favor having their country become a member of NATO, the Geneva accord specifies that Ukraine will remain outside of that “bloc” and thus face Russian power on its own.

            And seventeenth, Illarionov says, Ukrainians must now recognize that they have not only lost Crimea to Russia but may lose far more, that their state is at risk of dismemberment, and that those on whom they had hoped to rely to defend their position have betrayed them.

            The Russian commentator concludes with two extremely disturbing comments.  On the one hand, he says, what has now happened is that a major European country has been seized “without the use of tanks” because its own rulers have been “traitors” and that this seizure has been legitimated by the West. And on the other, while Esau exchanged his birthright for a bowl of food, Ukraine has given up something essential without getting even that in return.

Paul Goble

Putin Laughs at Your Sanctions

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/16/the_folly_of_sanctions_russia_ukraine_putin_deterrence

April 16, 2014

The United States needs to re-up its Cold War strategy if it wants to deter Russia in Ukraine.

Widely believed to be acting at the behest of Moscow, pro-Russian activists have seized government buildings in eastern Ukraine and prompted Kiev to carry out a limited set of military operations in the region. So far, the Ukrainian military has had little success dislodging pro-Russian forces, which for the most part appear unfazed. To bolster the Ukrainian government, the United States has unveiled a package of financial and economic sanctions directed at the Russian military and political establishment. Despite Moscow's vulnerabilities on this front, the threat of further economic retaliation has proven insufficient in deterring Moscow's aggression, as evidenced by the continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine. At the urging of the United States, the Ukrainian military has cautiously probed the positions of pro-Russian militants, while Washington has attempted to strike back at Moscow with financial sanctions. So far, that tactic has failed.

The Obama administration's decision to retaliate against Russia with financial and economic sanctions reflects a broader paradigm shift in U.S. deterrence strategy. Financial warfare is supplanting deterrence based on conventional military capabilities. However, events in Ukraine have exposed the risks of relying too heavily on financial instruments of power. Deterrence requires the United States to make clear that it will support Ukrainian military resistance to any further Russian intervention.

The administration's penchant for economic sanctions is understandable. Success in disrupting terrorist financing networks and in weakening rogue regimes has demonstrated the far-reaching toll that enhanced and fine-tuned sanctions can inflict in an interconnected global economy. At the same time, budget deficits at home and the costs of land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have prompted policymakers to embrace more deployable, economical instruments. Recent progress with Iran has reinforced Washington's growing preference for financial warfare. Tehran claims that it came to the negotiating table in exchange for U.S. recognition of its right to enrich uranium, but the Obama administration credits crippling sanctions for the breakthrough.

Russia also seems like a good target for economic warfare: It's a sophisticated economic and energy power that depends on access to global financial markets and international financial institutions to advance its geopolitical ambitions. Moreover, U.S. diplomatic efforts since 9/11 aimed at enlisting Russia's cooperation in enforcing international financial sanctions have sensitized President Vladimir Putin, as well as the corrupt elites in his inner circle, to the devastating impact that these policies can have against target regimes. Today, the ruble is in decline, the Russian Micex Index is down more than 10 percent since the beginning of the year, and the World Bank is projecting a contraction in the Russian economy of up to 1.8 percent in 2014 due to geopolitical instability. Yet none of these realities is stopping the Kremlin from fomenting instability and threatening further incursions into Ukraine. 

The shortcomings of economic sanctions don't by themselves suggest a need to downplay financial warfare in U.S. doctrine -- or even to enhance conventional capabilities. But they do demand that the United States calibrate its goals so that they match the capabilities it is realistically willing to deploy. The exact mix of financial and conventional military deterrence that must be brought to bear in any situation depends on what is at stake for the United States in the target country, and what is needed to secure important interests. 

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the extent to which the Obama administration is relying on financial instruments relative to conventional military deterrence is creating an alarming gap between Washington's stated goals and the capabilities it is willing to employ to achieve them. Given Ukraine's proximity to Russia, sizable populations of ethnic Russians, and importance in Moscow's strategic priorities -- not to mention Russia's overwhelming military superiority over its neighbors -- deterring further Russian aggression against non-allied but important states in the post-Soviet space will require more than targeted sanctions. 

Repeated assertions by President Barack Obama and other senior administration officials that a new Cold War is not on the horizon, while true at a global level, downplay the degree to which the renewed U.S.-Russian rivalry will resemble U.S.-Soviet competition on a regional scale. Throughout the Cold War, Moscow exerted enormous pressure on states on its periphery, as well as on states in the third world that fell outside the orbit of formal U.S. alliances. The West's victory in the Cold War stemmed, in large part, from Washington's success in deterring Soviet aggression against front-line states without deploying U.S. forces into combat. The United States convinced Stalin to back down in Iran in 1946, freed Austria from partial Soviet occupation in 1955, strengthened Israel's defenses against Soviet-aligned Arab states, and shielded Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The Cold War formula for defending front-line states involved a mix of political engagement, military sales and cooperation, and economic support through trade agreements and foreign aid. Even with the benefit of new sanctions capabilities, a similar playbook is necessary to prevent further Russian moves against Ukraine and other front-line states such as Georgia, as well as against U.S. partners in the Caucuses and Central Asia.

The greatest political challenge the United States faces in Ukraine is unifying the country's diverse communities. Important elements of the Party of Regions, the party led by ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, and Ukraine's Russian-speaking communities oppose the annexation of Crimea and Putin's heavy-handed intervention in Ukrainian affairs. U.S. and European engagement with these elements could help facilitate political inclusion under a decentralized system of government. A parallel process to integrate Ukraine into Western institutions such as the EU would incentivize cooperation of between the country's various factions.

On the military side, the Obama administration's decision to reject Kiev's initial requests for anti-tank and other weapons was a mistake. Instead, the United States should supply Ukraine with the materiel and training it needs to resist a Russian military intervention, and should persuade its allies to do the same. The White House, however, has calculated that the infusion of arms into Ukraine could escalate the crisis and undermine the prospects of a settlement with Russia. In fact, Moscow is more likely to negotiate if Putin recognizes the costs of pressing Russian claims militarily. 

Despite legitimate concerns over its readiness, the Ukrainian military, even in its current state, can make use of more weapons. As Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has assessed, the Ukrainian military needs infantry rifles, a training regimen, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. To determine the precise size of a multi-year package of arms sales and assistance, the Obama administration should send a team to assess the capabilities Ukraine would need to wage a successful insurgency against an invading Russian army.

Finally, Ukraine cannot realize its economic potential without long-term assistance. The initial package of International Monetary Fund and bilateral assistance will allow Ukraine to weather the immediate crisis. A medium- and long-term effort to diversify the country's energy sources, establish a credible economic reform program, and facilitate Ukrainian exports to Western markets, will require sustained Western cooperation with Kiev. Western influence in Ukraine will be contingent on the United States' willingness to compete with Russia's extensive economic influence in the country.

Without this kind of front-line state strategy, non-NATO member states could become victims of Putin's drive for Russian imperial restoration. But if Washington reawakens to the spirit of the Cold War strategy of deterrence, it could set the conditions for a new regional stability. Hardening the new government in Kiev against Russian destabilization, over time, would allow Ukraine to shoulder more of the burden of deterring Russia. And Moscow, in turn, would be more likely to conclude that further aggression against its neighbors is too risky a gamble.

Zalmay Khalilzad

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