April 16, 2014
The United States needs
to re-up its Cold War strategy if it wants to deter Russia in Ukraine.
Widely believed to be
acting at the behest of Moscow, pro-Russian activists have seized government
buildings in eastern Ukraine and prompted Kiev to carry out a limited set of
military operations in the region. So far, the Ukrainian military has had little
success dislodging pro-Russian forces, which for the most part appear unfazed.
To bolster the Ukrainian government, the United States has unveiled a package
of financial and economic sanctions directed at the Russian military and
political establishment. Despite Moscow's vulnerabilities on this front, the
threat of further economic retaliation has proven insufficient in deterring
Moscow's aggression, as evidenced by the continued destabilization of eastern
Ukraine. At the urging of the United States, the Ukrainian military has
cautiously probed the positions of pro-Russian militants, while Washington has
attempted to strike back at Moscow with financial sanctions. So far, that
tactic has failed.
The Obama
administration's decision to retaliate against Russia with financial and
economic sanctions reflects a broader paradigm shift in U.S. deterrence
strategy. Financial warfare is supplanting deterrence based on conventional
military capabilities. However, events in Ukraine have exposed the risks of
relying too heavily on financial instruments of power. Deterrence requires the
United States to make clear that it will support Ukrainian military resistance
to any further Russian intervention.
The administration's
penchant for economic sanctions is understandable. Success in disrupting
terrorist financing networks and in weakening rogue regimes has demonstrated
the far-reaching toll that enhanced and fine-tuned sanctions can inflict in an
interconnected global economy. At the same time, budget deficits at home and
the costs of land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have prompted policymakers to
embrace more deployable, economical instruments. Recent progress with Iran
has reinforced Washington's growing preference for financial
warfare. Tehran claims that it came to the negotiating table in exchange
for U.S. recognition of its right to enrich uranium, but the Obama
administration credits crippling sanctions for the breakthrough.
Russia also seems like
a good target for economic warfare: It's a sophisticated economic and energy
power that depends on access to global financial markets and international
financial institutions to advance its geopolitical ambitions. Moreover, U.S.
diplomatic efforts since 9/11 aimed at enlisting Russia's cooperation in
enforcing international financial sanctions have sensitized President Vladimir
Putin, as well as the corrupt elites in his inner circle, to the devastating
impact that these policies can have against target regimes. Today, the ruble is
in decline, the Russian Micex Index is down more than 10 percent since the
beginning of the year, and the World Bank is projecting a contraction in the
Russian economy of up to 1.8 percent in 2014 due to geopolitical instability.
Yet none of these realities is stopping the Kremlin from fomenting instability
and threatening further incursions into Ukraine.
The shortcomings of
economic sanctions don't by themselves suggest a need to downplay financial
warfare in U.S. doctrine -- or even to enhance conventional capabilities. But
they do demand that the United States calibrate its goals so that they match
the capabilities it is realistically willing to deploy. The exact mix of
financial and conventional military deterrence that must be brought to bear in
any situation depends on what is at stake for the United States in the target
country, and what is needed to secure important interests.
In the context of the
Ukrainian crisis, the extent to which the Obama administration is relying on
financial instruments relative to conventional military deterrence is creating
an alarming gap between Washington's stated goals and the capabilities it is
willing to employ to achieve them. Given Ukraine's proximity to Russia, sizable
populations of ethnic Russians, and importance in Moscow's strategic priorities
-- not to mention Russia's overwhelming military superiority over its neighbors
-- deterring further Russian aggression against non-allied but important states
in the post-Soviet space will require more than targeted sanctions.
Repeated assertions by
President Barack Obama and other senior administration officials that a new
Cold War is not on the horizon, while true at a global level, downplay the
degree to which the renewed U.S.-Russian rivalry will resemble U.S.-Soviet
competition on a regional scale. Throughout the Cold War, Moscow exerted
enormous pressure on states on its periphery, as well as on states in the third
world that fell outside the orbit of formal U.S. alliances. The West's victory
in the Cold War stemmed, in large part, from Washington's success in deterring
Soviet aggression against front-line states without deploying U.S. forces into
combat. The United States convinced Stalin to back down in Iran in 1946, freed
Austria from partial Soviet occupation in 1955, strengthened Israel's defenses
against Soviet-aligned Arab states, and shielded Pakistan during the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.
The Cold War formula
for defending front-line states involved a mix of political engagement,
military sales and cooperation, and economic support through trade agreements
and foreign aid. Even with the benefit of new sanctions capabilities, a similar
playbook is necessary to prevent further Russian moves against Ukraine and
other front-line states such as Georgia, as well as against U.S. partners in the
Caucuses and Central Asia.
The greatest political
challenge the United States faces in Ukraine is unifying the country's diverse
communities. Important elements of the Party of Regions, the party led by
ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, and Ukraine's Russian-speaking communities
oppose the annexation of Crimea and Putin's heavy-handed intervention in
Ukrainian affairs. U.S. and European engagement with these elements could help
facilitate political inclusion under a decentralized system of government. A
parallel process to integrate Ukraine into Western institutions such as the EU
would incentivize cooperation of between the country's various factions.
On the military side,
the Obama administration's decision to reject Kiev's initial requests for anti-tank
and other weapons was a mistake. Instead, the United States should supply
Ukraine with the materiel and training it needs to resist a Russian military
intervention, and should persuade its allies to do the same. The White House,
however, has calculated that the infusion of arms into Ukraine could escalate
the crisis and undermine the prospects of a settlement with Russia. In fact,
Moscow is more likely to negotiate if Putin recognizes the costs of pressing
Russian claims militarily.
Despite legitimate
concerns over its readiness, the Ukrainian military, even in its current state,
can make use of more weapons. As Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has assessed, the Ukrainian military needs infantry
rifles, a training regimen, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. To
determine the precise size of a multi-year package of arms sales and
assistance, the Obama administration should send a team to assess the
capabilities Ukraine would need to wage a successful insurgency against an
invading Russian army.
Finally, Ukraine cannot
realize its economic potential without long-term assistance. The initial
package of International Monetary Fund and bilateral assistance will allow
Ukraine to weather the immediate crisis. A medium- and long-term effort to diversify
the country's energy sources, establish a credible economic reform program, and
facilitate Ukrainian exports to Western markets, will require sustained Western
cooperation with Kiev. Western influence in Ukraine will be contingent on the
United States' willingness to compete with Russia's extensive economic
influence in the country.
Without this kind of
front-line state strategy, non-NATO member states could become victims of
Putin's drive for Russian imperial restoration. But if Washington reawakens to
the spirit of the Cold War strategy of deterrence, it could set the conditions
for a new regional stability. Hardening the new government in Kiev against
Russian destabilization, over time, would allow Ukraine to shoulder more of the
burden of deterring Russia. And Moscow, in turn, would be more likely to
conclude that further aggression against its neighbors is too risky a gamble.
Zalmay Khalilzad
